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Abstract
This paper develops a model of small open economy, with a differenti-
ated goods sector and voluntary provisioning of public good. It is shown that
trade policy can alter the quantity of public good provided in the equilib-
rium. Interestingly, tariffs may fail to protect, leading to a Metzler Paradox
like situation. This is because the income effect generated due to the impo-
sition of tariff can lead to an increase in the contribution to the public good.
An expanding public sector crowds out the import competing sector. This
result holds unambiguously in the neighbourhood of free trade.
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1. Introduction
A good or a service is considered to be public, if it is non-rival in con-
sumption. Thus, these goods are potentially for collective consumptions. In
general, markets fail to allocate public goods efficiently and thus the issue of
providing and financing public goods through collective action has become
an important issue in the literature. Oslon (1965) had argued that in a
society with competing political groups, provision of public good becomes
increasingly difficult through voluntary contribution, as the group size in-
creases. Chamberlin (1974) and Mcguire (1974), show that in a competitive
set-up, if the public good provided is a normal good, then contribution by
each member increases and reaches a finite value with an increasing group
size. Cornes and Sandler (1989) builds a model, with both a public good
and private good. Both these goods are produced with labour. Increase in
labour endowment of each individual increases his contribution to the pub-
lic good. In the two factor model developed by Vicary (2004) the effect of
group size become ambiguous and depends on the relative factor intensities
of the public good and the private good.
Pecuniro (2009) builds a model, where labour is employed between a
differentiated private goods sector and a public good sector. As labour
increases, the variety sector expands which in turns implies a higher ex-
penditure on the differentiated goods sector. This increases the marginal
utility of income and thus the aggregate contribution made to the public
good falls. In Mondal (2013), marginal utility of income is inversely related
to the aggregate expenditure on the variety sector and thus increasing group
size, in contrast to Pecuniro (2009) increases the aggregate contribution to
the public good.
The present model, extends Mondal (2013) and incorporates trade in the
differentiated goods sector. The economy is assumed to be small, in a sense
that the prices of the foreign brands and the number of foreign varieties are
exogenously given (See Sen et al. 1997). Imposition of tariff, by the home
country in such a set up has interesting implications. An increase in tariff
cetirus paribus (that is at the level of constant import demand), increases
the income of the individuals through the tariff income rebated to the agents.
This generates an “income effect” by which agents would contribute more to
the public good and thus increase the aggregate expenditure on public goods.
Market clearing implies that an expanding public goods sector draws labour
out of the differentiated goods sector and thus this sector may contract.
Tariffs then would fail to protect the import competing sector. Such a
result is reminiscent of the famous Metzler Paradox result in classical trade
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theory (See Metzler 1949).
Competitive trade theory has an extensive literature that deals with the
effects of imposition of tariffs. In general, imposition of tariff has two ef-
fects, firstly, it enhances welfare by improving the terms of trade for the
tariff imposing country, and secondly, it reduces welfare by causing the im-
port competing sector to expand (and thus crowd out cheaper importables).
Competitive trade theory identifies a situation known as the Metzler Para-
dox (see Metzler 1949), when the improvement in terms of trade, for the
tariff imposing nation is so high that it actually lowers the domestic price
of the output of the import competing sector and thus fail to protect it.
Helpman and Krugman (1989) builds a model of trade with monopolistic
competition and scale economies. They show that in such set up, the price
lowering effect of the tariffs can become more pronounced since it requires
much lesser restrictive conditions than Metzler (1949). A single factor of
production, labour is allocated between a differentiated goods sector and
a homogeneous goods sector. Differentiated goods sector is traded but is
subject to transportation costs while trading of the homogeneous good is
costless. Imposition of tariffs in a two country world leads to re-allocation
of firms in the tariff imposing country. Since the relatively cheaper home va-
rieties increases; the aggregate price index faced by the domestic consumers
fall. Home market effects can thus lower the domestic price of the import
competing sector.3 The present model is also related to this class of liter-
ature. However, the possibility that tariffs may fail to protect the import
competing sector comes through a completely different channel (not through
home market effects) and in a different manner. Increase in the tariff, in-
creases the revenue earned from the imports directly. As this tariff income
is rebated back to the agents, it reduces the marginal utility of income and
thus agents increase their contribution to the public good. On the other
hand, increase in the tariff rate causes the import demand to fall, which
may reverse the effect. The net effect thus is ambiguous. To focus on the
intuition, we study the equilibrium in the neighbourhood of free trade. Near
the free trade equilibrium, the first effect dominates the second and tariffs
fail to protect the import competing sector unambiguously. The number
of domestic (import competing) brands falls and the total volume of the
import competing sector contracts.
The next section outlines the basic model, and section-3 develops the
3Davis (1998) builds another model that discusses the implications of home market
effects and trade policy.
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comparative statics. The last section concludes the model.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a hypothetical small open economy which produces nh number
of varieties domestically and imports nf number of varieties from foreign.
“Smallness” implies that the number and prices of the foreign varieties are
exogenously given to this economy as in Sen (1997). Moreover, the agents
also consume a public good, G which is financed by voluntary contribution
of the agents. All the agents supply one unit of labour inelastically and total
number of residents is assumed to be L. Government imposes a tariff on the
import of the foreign varieties. The utility function of the agents is given by
U = log
( nh∑
i
Cρh +
nf∑
j
Cρf
) 1
ρ
+ f(G/w). (1)
where f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. Ch indicates the representative consumption
of the home variety while Cf is the consumption of any foreign variety. σ
(= 11−ρ) is the elasticity of substitution and σ > 1 as ρ ∈ (0, 1). G and w are
the total expenditure on the public good and the wage rate in the economy
respectively. For simplicity, it is assumed that one unit of labour is used for
producing one unit of public good. Thus Gw is the total labour employed for
the production of public good. Suppose the voluntary contribution made
by each individual is given by g. Then G = gL as all agents are symmetric.
Then the demand functions can be obtained by maximising (1) when the
income of each consumer is
M = w + T/L. (2)
M , w are the individual income and the wage rate earned by the individual
by supplying the one unit of labour it possess inelastically respectively. T
is the aggregate tariff revenue earned by the government which we assume
to be rebated equally among the agents. Utility maximisation implies
Ch
Cf
=
(
ph
pf (1 + t)
)−σ
. (3)
ph, pf and t represents the prices of the home produced brand, imported
brand and the tariff rate respectively. Each consumer would make a volun-
4
tary contribution 4
g = w + T/L− w
f ′(G/w)
. (4)
Total amount of public good thus produced in the economy would be given
by
G = wL+ T − wL
f ′(G/w)
. (5)
Domestic production of each variety requires α units of labourers to
start production and β units of labourers for each additional unit of output
produced. Producers maximise profits by equating the marginal revenue
with the marginal cost.
ph(1− 1
σ
) = βw. (6)
which implies,
ph =
βw
ρ
. (7)
Free entry in the variety sector, means that in the equilibrium, firms would
equate the surplus with the fixed costs of production,
phxh
σ
= αw =⇒ xh = αρ
β(1− ρ) , (8)
when xh is the output of the domestic firm. Total value of exports made
by this small open economy is nhph(xh − LCh) and the aggregate value of
imports is given by nfpfLCf . Balance of payments would require that value
of imports should be equal to the value of exports.
nhph(xh − LCh) = nfpfLCf . (9)
The tariff revenue earned by the government is given by
T = tnfpfCfL. (10)
Labour is required for production of the public good and the variety sector.
Labour is assumed to be the numeraire and thus w = 1. Thus the labour
market clearing condition is
nh(α+ βx) +G = L. (11)
Equations (1) to (11) completes the description of the model.
4See Mondal (2013) for derivation of this demand function.
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3. Comparitive statics
To understand the effect of tariffs in this model, we totally differentiate
equation (9) to get
nˆh − sCˆh = Cˆf , (12)
where s = LChxh−LCh , and s > 0 the ratio of aggregate domestic consumption
of each brand to its imports. Utility maximisation implies that Cˆh = Cˆf +
σ dt1+t (See equation(3)). Substituting this into equation (12), we obtain an
equation involving nˆh and Cˆf .
nˆh − (1 + s)Cˆf = σsdt
1 + t
. (13)
From equation (5),
dG = tnfpfCf (Cˆf + tˆ) + Lf
′−2f ′′dG.
which would in turn imply
Gˆ =
tnfpfCf (tˆ+ Cˆf )
G[1− L f ′′
f ′2 ]
. (14)
Using the labour market clearing condition (11) equation (14) can be written
as
−[1− L f
′′
f ′2
](α+ βx)nhnˆh − tnfpfCf Cˆf = nfpfCfdt. (15)
Solving equations (13) and (15) the change in total number of home pro-
duced varieties and the import demand due to a change in tariffs can be
expressed as:
nˆh =
−(1 + s)nfpfCf + tnfpfCfσs1+t
D
dt. (16)
Cˆf = −
[1− L f ′′
f ′2 ](α+ βx)nhσs/(1 + t) + nfpfCf
D
dt. (17)
where D = nh(1 + s)(1− Lf
′′
f ′2 )(α+ βx) + tnfpfCf > 0.
Equations (16) and (17) can be used to derive the following propositions.
Proposition 1. Tariffs may fail to protect the import competing sector.
Moreover, around the free trade equilibrium an increase in tariffs cause an
unambiguous contraction of the import competing sector.
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Proof. Consider equation(16). The number of brands produced by the im-
port competing sector will decline if the parametrisation σt1+t− 1+ss < 0 holds.
It is straightforward to check that around the free trade equilibrium,(t = 0),
imposition of tariffs reduce the total number of varieties produced by the
home economy. This implies that tariffs fail to protect the import competing
sector in the presence of public good. This is because as the per firm output
produced by the import competing sector is constant, the volume of import
competing sector’s output (nhxh) contracts unambiguously.
Imposition of tariff increases the total income accruing to the consumers,
which thus reduces the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good.
Thus the voluntary contribution to the public good increases, which draws
labour out of the production of the home produced varieties. As the per
firm output is constant, the total number of home produced varieties gets
reduced, which in turn implies that the total volume of the import com-
peting sector (nhxh) contracts. This can be summarized as the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. In the neighbourhood of the free trade equilibrium, imposi-
tion of tariffs increases the tariff revenue.
Proof. Differentiating equation (5) we get
dT
dt
= tnfpf
dCf
dt
+ nfpfCf (18)
Assuming free trade (that is, t = 0), dTdt > 0.
Equation (17) shows the usual effect of tariffs on the import demand.
The volume of import falls, because imposition of tariffs makes it dearer to
the consumers. From the labour market clearing condition (11), near the
free trade equilibrium a fall in the number of varieties implies higher output
of the public good.
4. Conclusion
Metzler (1949) had shown that tariffs may fail to protect the import
competing sector. This can happen when the improvement in terms is very
large. Helpman and Krugman (1989) builds a model of monopolistic com-
petition and love for variety and shows that home market effects can lead to
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Metzler Paradox type result. The present model generates a similar result,
though through a completely different channel. Presence of a public good
implies, that around the free trade equilibrium the differentiated goods sec-
tor (which is the import competing sector) would contract. Thus, tariffs
may fail to protect, though in general, the effect of tariffs on public good
and the total volume of the import competing sector remains ambiguous.
This is interesting because tariffs are often invoked to protect the domestic
import competing industry.
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